Israeli attacks leave at least 20 dead in Gaza
By Rodrigo Santos Andrade
Africa’s Red Sea states face growing risks as Houthi rebels expand their reach
visibility comment0 event September 17, 2026 timer 13:15
The African shoreline is now much more valuable to outsiders who want to monitor, contain or outflank the waterway opposite them.
The Houthi takeover of parts of the Red Sea gives the armed group a new platform to challenge global shipping. The group has taken over the port of Mocha, the island of Mayyun, and the Zuqar and Hanish archipelago about 160km north of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. These areas were previously controlled by Yemeni government forces.
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is a narrow maritime chokepoint roughly 32km wide. Lying between the Arabian Peninsula to the north-east and the Horn of Africa to the south-west, it directly links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
This geography matters. Mayyun Island, for example, divides a waterway that is used by international shipping. Historically, this passage accounts for about 12% of global trade.
The African side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait hasn’t been taken over by the Houthis. But the group’s September 2026 advance has serious economic and security implications for Egypt, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea, with the potential to escalate existing conflicts in Somalia and Sudan.
The Houthis are an Iran-aligned armed movement that controls much of Yemen, and has been fighting the country’s internationally recognised government since seizing the capital in 2014.
I have studied global maritime geopolitics and security, including issues involving the Red Sea, for more than two decades. In my view, the Houthi threat is not just a logistical one. It also poses a strategic danger to Africa’s Red Sea states.
The African shoreline is suddenly much more valuable to outsiders who want to monitor, contain or outflank the waterway opposite them. The Houthis now occupy armed posts around the strait, bringing the threat closer to the critical shipping corridor.
Read more:
The Houthis have further tightened their grip on the Red Sea. Here’s what it could mean for the world
As it stands, an Iran-backed non-state armed group may now be able to deploy missiles, mines and fast-attack craft along an extended length of the eastern Red Sea. At the same time, Iran retains the ability to block the Strait of Hormuz.
This raises the risk of simultaneous disruption at two important maritime chokepoints, potentially leaving ships with no safe route through the Red Sea.
The risks for Africa
Disruption on the Red Sea cascades through four channels of African economies: shipping and insurance costs, port revenue, energy and food prices, and maritime security risks.
Red Sea states
Egypt
Egypt bears the highest direct financial risk. In 2024, the decline in Red Sea traffic resulting from Houthi attacks on commercial shipping cost Cairo an estimated US$7 billion in lost Suez Canal revenue. Revenue reached US$4.67 billion for the fiscal year 2025-26, which represents a 23% increase compared to the previous year. But if the diversion of shipping continues, it will soon reverse the improvement in revenue.
Djibouti, Ethiopia and Eritrea
Over 2,000 people fleeing the hostilities in western Yemen have crossed over to Djibouti’s northern shores. Renewed fighting has pushed displacement since the escalation began in early September 2026 to nearly 94,000.
Djibouti is also a key external trade conduit for Ethiopia, which is landlocked. Ethiopia conducts approximately 95% of its trade via Djibouti.
Eritrea is also vulnerable along the frontlines. Its geographical position makes it attractive to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which want to ensure that Iran and the Houthis don’t have too much influence on the African side of the Red Sea.
Somalia and Sudan
The Houthi crisis compounds the existing crises in Somalia and Sudan.
The Houthis and Somali terror group al-Shabaab have exchanged weapons, drone technology and training in exchange for facilitating piracy off the coast of Somalia. This happens while an African Union mission in Somalia is trying to keep al-Shabaab under control.
As a result, the number of piracy incidents off Somalia’s coast jumped to a 10-year high in 2026. Somalia approved an anti-piracy bill in September 2026, aimed at preventing maritime abductions.
Read more:
Global power shifts are playing out in the Red Sea region: why this is where the rules are changing
In Sudan, Iranian support has reached parts of the Sudanese Armed Forces. The army is battling the United Arab Emirates-backed Rapid Support Forces.
By mid-2024, the Houthis had reportedly begun helping Iran supply weapons to the Sudanese army. The US Treasury has sanctioned key Sudanese figures over these ties to Iran.
The implication is uncomfortable: the Red Sea’s African shore is not only exposed to the Houthis, it has begun to serve them.
Competition for political control
The current geopolitical shifts in the Red Sea predate the Houthi offensive.
In January 2024, Ethiopia signed a memorandum with the breakaway region of Somaliland for access to its Red Sea coast and a naval base. This was in exchange for a path towards recognition.
Somalia, Eritrea and Egypt opposed the deal. Within a year, they had established a joint security mechanism.
Regional security cooperation has since accelerated. In July 2026, Saudi Arabia hosted talks at which 14 countries – including Egypt, Djibouti, Sudan and Somalia – established the Multinational Maritime Defence Alliance.
The UAE – following clashes with Saudi-backed forces in Yemen in December 2025 – and landlocked Ethiopia are excluded.
Read more:
Red Sea crisis: expert unpacks Houthi attacks and other security threats
At the same time, a competing alignment involving the UAE, Israel and Ethiopia has emerged, strengthened by Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December 2025. On the other side are Somalia, Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
Iran has also sought a military foothold along the Red Sea corridor, including in Sudan. Eritrea, meanwhile, is using its strategic coastline to strengthen its regional position and counterbalance Ethiopia.
The result is a growing contest for influence in which Middle Eastern powers are making greater use of Africa’s strategic position.
What’s to be done
No single African state can protect the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, but governments can minimise some consequences by diversifying port access and inland trade routes. A more direct lever is improving maritime security capacity at the regional level.
In August 2026, state signatories to the Djibouti Code of Conduct and its expanded Jeddah Amendment committed to forming a combined task force to combat piracy.
The success of this initiative will rely on the ability of governments to provide the ships, intelligence, personnel and legal frameworks necessary to make this a functional security mechanism.
African states are not yet setting the broader strategic agenda, but their control of chokepoints increases their diplomatic leverage. The challenge is to use that leverage without becoming proxies in a wider Middle Eastern confrontation.
Burak Şakir Şeker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Tags: Academic Journalism, The Conversation, The Conversation Academic News
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