Why Europe’s new defence agenda depends not only on armies, but also on citizens

0 October 19, 2026 11:21

The EU may not yet have a common army but via its citizens, member states can foster a culture of resilience and solidarity if all levels of society can pull together.

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KEY TAKEAWAYS

Europe faces growing hybrid threats beyond conventional warfare. Alongside the conflict in Ukraine, European countries are experiencing suspected sabotage, cyberattacks, drone incidents, espionage and disinformation campaigns.
Citizens and communities are essential to Europe’s security alongside governments and armed forces whose duty is to provide national defence.
Europe needs a stronger, shared culture of civic preparedness to protect its territory and the institutions that sustain everyday life.

Europe’s security debate is often framed in the familiar language of armies, weapons systems and borders. These remain essential. Governments and armed forces must remain the primary providers of national defence. However, the nature of attacks on Europe has changed, making societies themselves part of the security equation.

The war in Ukraine has made the return of large-scale conventional war to Europe impossible to ignore. Yet the pressure now facing European states extends beyond conventional warfare. It also takes the form of cybernetics’s, sabotage, pressure on critical infrastructure, drone incidents into EU territory, foreign information manipulation and the use of criminal networks or economic dependencies for strategic purposes.

Recent research by ACLED describes suspected Russian activity in Europe as a pattern of operations designed to test support for Ukraine while staying below the threshold of open military confrontation.

Between January 2022 and April 2025, ACLED mapped 190 such incidents across Europe, including 59 drone overflights, 45 acts of sabotage, 15 cases of spying, 13 cases of vandalism, 12 arson incidents and six cyberattacks.

Germany accounted for the most recorded incidents, with 39, followed by Norway with 19, Finland with 17, and Poland with 16. ACLED also notes that more than half of all suspicious events since February 2022 took place in 2024, when around 35% were sabotage and 27% were unauthorised drone overflights. Global think tank GLOBSEC and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism have also documented a related pattern: the use of criminal actors and so-called “disposable” agents in sabotage and arson plots across Europe. Their
updated dataset identifies 151 known cases between February 2022 and February 2026, including 41 additional incidents since their previous report.

When everyday life is targeted

Many of these actions do not target the state apparatus in a traditional military sense. They target the systems on which societies depend on in everyday life: electricity, communications, transport, local administrations, information spaces and trust between citizens. A damaged cable, a hacked municipal system or a false story spreading online may not look like war in the classical sense.

Nevertheless, each can weaken confidence in institutions, deepen social division and make democratic societies harder to govern under pressure. This is why Europe’s new defence agenda cannot be only about armies. It must also be about the capacity of citizens and communities to remain calm, informed and functional when disruption happens.

While 81% of Europeans are in favour of a common defence and security policy among EU Member States – the highest result since 2004, 78% of citizens are concerned with the EU’s security and defence capabilities, according to data from the Eurobarometer 2025.

The European Union recognises how instrumental citizens and communities can be in crisis response or when facing security challenges and how vital they are in helping Europe sustain solidarity under pressure. Its Preparedness Union Strategy, launched in 2025, calls for an “all-hazards” and “whole-of-society” approach and encourages citizens to maintain essential supplies for at least 72 hours in an emergency. This is not a call to panic. It acknowledges that resilience cannot be built only from the centre.

Citizens cannot stop missiles or replace intelligence services. They cannot protect undersea cables or defend airspace. However, they can refuse to become part of the disruption. If an adversary spreads a false story, individual behaviour matters: do we share it, check it, or amplify outrage because it confirms what we already believe? If sabotage disrupts electricity, mobile networks or electronic payments, preparation matters: do households have water, a torch, cash, power banks and a way to contact family members? Panic, mistrust and paralysis are vulnerabilities. Calm, competence and cooperation are assets.

Redefining shared responsibilities

This does not mean militarising society or transferring responsibility from the state to individuals.

Governments still have the duty to protect citizens, invest in defence, secure infrastructure and communicate honestly. At the same time, citizens also have a role because many hybrid attacks are designed to reach them directly – through fear, confusion, inconvenience and mistrust.

Communicating this is difficult, because for decades after the Cold War, many Europeans became used to peace and to the idea that security was a service delivered by the state. Citizens voted in elections, paid taxes and assumed that professionals would take care of the rest. That expectation is understandable, but is no longer sufficient.

At the same time, governments and experts are rightly cautious about spreading fear. Too much alarmist language can paralyse rather than prepare. But silence is not neutral either. Citizens already hear about sabotage, cyberattacks, drones and war through social media, television and everyday conversations. If trusted institutions do not explain what these threats mean and what people can realistically do, fear becomes easier to manipulate.

Protecting Europe from within

Europe therefore needs a better language of preparedness: honest without being dramatic, practical without being militaristic, and empowering without pretending that citizens can replace the state.

Preparedness should be presented as civic maturity, not paranoia. That means linking information to action. A blackout, cyberattack, or disinformation campaign can disrupt daily life. However, simple steps reduce vulnerability: a family contact plan, basic supplies for two or three days, trusted sources of information, school and workplace procedures, neighbourhood support networks, and the habit of checking before sharing.

These are not abstract ideas. They are already being practised in Europe: Finland and Denmark promote 72-hour household preparedness; Sweden’s crisis-or-war brochure tells citizens how to prepare and what to do; Czechia has school programmes on emergency numbers, dangerous situations and siren signals; and local initiatives in Brussels and France connect citizens with crisis-response and civil-protection volunteering. These measures help turn abstract anxiety into actions people can take.

This is also where the European way of life enters the discussion. We often use that phrase as if it referred only to rights, values and institutions. It does, but those rights and institutions depend on social infrastructure: trust, pluralism, reliable information, functioning local institutions and citizens who can disagree without treating one another as enemies.

Protecting Europe is therefore not only about defending territory, but it is also about defending the conditions that make democratic life possible under pressure.

Europe needs a new social contract for security

This should not mean replacing national responsibility, but connecting it through common standards, shared reserves, joint exercises, and a stronger culture of preparedness across society.

The EU is already moving in this direction through the Preparedness Union Strategy, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, rescEU strategic reserves (that are fully EU funded including a fleet of aircraft for firefighting, evacuation or providing medical relief), stockpiling initiatives, and new work on preparedness education. These initiatives point to a broader security model that combines military defence with civil preparedness based on cooperation and pooling of resources, institutional resilience, and democratic education, because a society that can keep functioning during disruption is harder to intimidate.

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Monika Sus co-founded and now co-leads the EU Security Initiative (EUSI) at the European University Institute.

Tags: Academic Journalism, The Conversation, The Conversation Academic News