Rihanna Spotted Heading to César Restaurant in Paris After Céline Dion Concert
By Rodrigo Santos Andrade
NZ’s next government will inherit a Treaty debate that is far from resolved
visibility comment0 event October 19, 2026 timer 23:31
How much should Māori voices count in public life? And when does decisionmaking belong outside government and within Māori institutions?
Joe Allison/Getty ImagesFor the past three years, reducing the role of te Tiriti o Waitangi/Treaty of Waitangi in public life has been one of the coalition government’s main priorities.
This has meant removing references to te Tiriti in legislation, abolishing institutions such as the Māori Health Authority, and reversing a previous trend toward strengthening Māori language and culture in public institutions.
The government’s argument has been that equality and effectiveness in policy, and the delivery of government services, should be based on “need, not race” (although there is no mention of “race” in te Tiriti).
In different ways, the parties in opposition have argued that culture and colonial context (which are not at all the same as “race”) are highly relevant to policy working as well for Māori as for anyone else.
This ideological fault line runs through the current election campaign, too. Depending on the final result, it may again be a defining feature of the next parliament.
A polarised parliament
So far, the National Party hasn’t released a specific Treaty policy for 2026. But the two smaller coalition parties, ACT and New Zealand First, are promising to continue the pattern of the past three years.
Both want to abolish the Waitangi Tribunal once final historical settlements have been reached (the implication being that te Tiriti can’t be breached in the present or future).
That’s despite the tribunal itself having found government policies – in education, health, child care and protection, citizenship, local government, and marine and coastal area rights – have breached the Treaty over the past three years.
As the ACT Party’s Treaty Principles Bill showed, the debate has become deeply polarising. Around 270,000 people made submissions against the bill, which essentially sought to redefine the meaning of the Treaty’s three articles, and 40,000 marched against it. Some 10,000 showed their opposition at a hui convened by King Tuheitia before the bill was introduced.
Those are significant numbers in a population of just over five million, and National didn’t support the bill largely because it was so divisive.
Instead, the party was concerned with more trivial matters, such as banning bilingual road signs and Māori words in primary school reading materials. To its critics, however, the message was the same: Māori culture doesn’t really belong – on the road or at school.
National and ACT are traditionally parties of small government. Previous National governments have encouraged business, non-governmental organisations and Māori service providers to deliver services governments might otherwise offer.
The current coalition, however, has reversed policies of Māori independence and cultural distinctiveness and reaffirmed state authority in areas such as health, education and the care and protection of children.
The Opportunity factor
Predicting what Treaty policy might look like after the election is difficult, not least because of the possible shape the next government could take.
Prime Minister Christopher Luxon has repeatedly said National won’t form a government with the Opportunity Party – despite that potentially being his party’s only path back to government.
And working with Opportunity would be a possible alternative to working with New Zealand First – whose leader Winston Peters has openly said he doesn’t put Luxon in the same league as the best prime ministers.
For its part, Opportunity wants legislation to give “proper effect” to Treaty obligations, although it isn’t specific about what that means.
Another goal is clearer: replacing “recurring conflict with practical partnership, long-term certainty, and local Māori-led solutions that close the outcomes gap and deliver a stronger future for everyone”.
A “balanced and transparent national conversation” should, the party says, provide a detailed pathway. But none of this was contained in the bottom lines Opportunity laid out for potential coalition negotiations.
Were Opportunity to swing left rather than right, there would be some compatibility with Labour, Green and Te Pāti Māori policies.
However, the differences between Labour and Te Pāti Māori are so wide it would be misleading to speak of them as ready to form a coalition.
Read more: Election Policy Tracker: your guide to what the parties are promising during the 2026 election campaign
Parliament and te Tiriti
While Te Pāti Māori undoubtedly wants to change the government, Labour leader Chris Hipkins has said “senior roles for them in government are unlikely”.
By offering Labour only confidence and supply support, Te Pāti Māori could achieve its objective of changing the government. What it gains in return, however, may be limited.
That’s important because Te Pāti Māori wants Waitangi Tribunal decisions to be binding, and an independent commission set up with powers to stop ministers taking actions it deemed in breach of the Treaty.
(Unlike binding decisions by the tribunal, the commission’s orders could be appealed to the High Court.)
But Labour wants to maintain parliamentary supremacy over tribunal decisions. On this point (though not many others), that puts the party closer to the right than to some of its potential coalition partners on the left.
ACT, for instance, agrees parliament sits above the Treaty, although it expresses it more strongly as parliamentary “sovereignty”.
ACT also doesn’t want the courts to apply tikanga (Māori cultural values and conduct) to legal decisions unless parliament has explicitly said they should.
However, Labour would keep the Waitangi Tribunal and isn’t proposing changes to its functions and powers. It would restore Treaty references in legislation, and the Treaty obligations on school boards of trustees that were repealed earlier this year.
While those policies would promote distinctive Māori voices in public life, the party won’t restore the Māori Health Authority. It argues resources will reach Māori health providers more quickly and simply without a new central structure.
Rangatiratanga and government
Like Te Pāti Māori, the Green Party wants to make Waitangi Tribunal recommendations binding. And like the Opportunity Party’s position, there’s an implicit recognition of rangatiratanga – the independent political authority te Tiriti affirmed.
In this sense, te Tiriti is as much about what governments don’t do – and what Māori do for themselves – as it is about what governments do.
The Greens describe this as resourcing Māori “to lead restorative and rehabilitative justice and provide for the wellbeing of whānau, the environment and other natural ecosystems”.
The party will use “critical Tiriti analysis” – a policy development and evaluation method two colleagues and I developed – to review draft policy.
Critical Tiriti analysis presumes a substantive Māori voice in policy making, and proposes that if a policy is meant to benefit Māori people, it is Māori people who get to say whether it’s useful or not.
It suggests policy makers should always ask whether rangatiratanga means a particular policy is really the responsibility of an iwi, hapū, Māori health provider or some other Māori entity. That’s an idea that, in any other context, would fit well with the small government ideas of the political right.
These are the ideological fault lines that separate some parties but also bring others together. Who does what, how, why and for whom? How much should Māori voices count in public life? And when does decision making best belong outside government and in Māori institutions?
The next government, whatever its composition, will not be able to avoid these questions.
From the cost of living and a health system under extreme pressure to how best to tackle climate change, the coming election involves some big choices.
This article is part of The Conversation’s Election 2026 series: expert analysis of the major policy debates and the big challenges New Zealand’s next government will face.
Dominic O’Sullivan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Tags: Academic Journalism, The Conversation, The Conversation Academic News
No Comments
