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By Rodrigo Santos Andrade
Gibran’s resignation clears the way for Prabowo to consolidate power, raising concerns over shrinking political checks, and centralized state resources.
Gibran Rakabuming Raka’s resignation as Indonesia’s vice president on Thursday, November 12, 2026, marks more than an end to a political controversy. It could remove the last major obstacle to President Prabowo Subianto’s efforts to consolidate power and bring Indonesia’s political system under tighter presidential control.
Gibran submitted his resignation to Prabowo and the leadership of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) shortly before the House of Representatives (DPR) was scheduled to consider invoking its right to state an opinion (Hak Menyatakan Pendapat, or HMP), a procedure that could lead to impeachment.
The move followed a Supreme Court ruling annulling his high school equivalency certificate, which he had used to qualify for the 2024 vice presidential election. The day before he resigned, 120 lawmakers from all eight parliamentary factions had backed the HMP motion. After his resignation, the DPR cancelled its plenary session.
Gibran’s departure leaves Prabowo without a rival power centre within the executive, at least until a replacement vice president is elected. More importantly, it weakens the political network of former president Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, whose influence helped bring Prabowo to power in 2024.
With seven of the eight parties in parliament backing Prabowo’s coalition, the president has greater room to concentrate political and state resources in his own hands.
From oligarchic rivalry to presidential dominance
The Prabowo–Gibran partnership underscored the pragmatism of coalitions among Indonesia’s political parties.
Prabowo had twice lost presidential elections to Jokowi before joining his cabinet as defence minister in October 2019. Prabowo’s eventual partnership with Gibran was made possible by a Constitutional Court decision, which allowed candidates under 40 to run for president or vice president if they had held elected office.
Issued under Chief Justice Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle, the ruling triggered accusations of political nepotism and earned the court the nickname “Family Court.”
Jokowi’s political influence was built on substantial public support. Indikator Politik Indonesia’s October 2024 survey found that 74.96 percent of respondents remained satisfied with his performance shortly before he left office. This popularity helped Prabowo and Gibran secure their electoral victory.
But their alliance was never built on shared political interests. Once Prabowo assumed office, the two camps began competing for control over political networks, bureaucratic positions and state resources. Gibran’s frequent public appearances and distribution of aid, reminiscent of Jokowi’s populist style, also raised speculation that he was positioning himself for the 2029 election.
Without a political party of his own, however, Gibran had limited leverage. Prabowo gradually weakened the networks associated with his predecessor. He removed National Police Chief Listyo Sigit Prabowo, a longtime Jokowi loyalist, in an effort to loosen Jokowi’s hold over the police.
Earlier, Erick Thohir, a former Jokowi ally who had led the state-owned enterprises ministry, was moved to the youth and sports portfolio in September 2025.
The creation of Danantara—which consolidated Indonesia’s state-owned enterprise assets—further eroded Jokowi’s influence.
This rivalry reflects what political sociologists Vedi Hadiz and Richard Robison observed in 2004: Suharto’s fall did not dismantle Indonesia’s oligarchy but merely allowed it to reorganise within democratic institutions. Political competition thus became a struggle among rival elites for state power and economic resources.
Jeffrey Winters makes a related argument in his book, Oligarchy (2011), examining how concentrated wealth enables elites to protect and extend their political power.
From this perspective, Gibran’s resignation is not simply the defeat of one political figure. It represents another stage in the redistribution of power within Indonesia’s oligarchy, this time increasingly toward Prabowo.
The architecture of centralized power
Prabowo’s efforts to centralise authority extend well beyond his political rivalry with Jokowi. His flagship programs, including Free Nutritious Meals (MBG), Red and White Village Cooperatives and People’s Schools, require substantial funding and coordination from the central government. They also expand the state’s presence in local communities, creating new channels through which the administration can exercise influence.
The growing involvement of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in civilian programs adds another dimension. Military personnel have been deployed to support MBG kitchens, accelerate the construction of village cooperatives and instil discipline among students at People’s Schools. This blurs the boundaries between civilian administration and military responsibilities, potentially strengthening the president’s reach into everyday governance.
Danantara also offers another instrument for consolidating control. Unlike Jokowi, who relied heavily on state-owned enterprises to drive infrastructure development, Prabowo has established a centralised structure for managing their assets. According to the International Monetary Fund’s 2025 report, Danantara consolidates state-owned enterprises under one entity, with both Danantara and the new state-owned enterprise regulatory body reporting directly to the president. This gives the administration considerable influence over state capital and investment decisions.
Fiscal policy has moves in a similar direction. The central government’s cuts to regional fiscal transfers have placed local administrations under pressure, prompting 18 governors from the Association of Indonesian Provincial Governments (APPSI) to protest to the finance minister against the cuts.
As The Jakarta Post reported in October 2025, the proposed reductions threatened regional budgets already heavily dependent on central government funding. The dispute highlights the limits of Indonesia’s decentralisation Indonesia has pursued since the 1998 Reformasi, which has never fully translated into meaningful regional autonomy.
This concentration of authority builds on a process that began under Jokowi. His administration expanded presidential influence over political institutions and state resources, creating a model of governance that Prabowo can now take further.
The rivalry between the two presidents was therefore less a clash between opposing visions of power than a struggle over who would control the machinery of the state.
What comes next?
Prabowo’s position is now stronger, but greater control does not necessarily mean greater political stability. The weakening of Jokowi’s network may settle one elite rivalry, but competition over access to state resources could generate new conflicts within Prabowo’s own coalition.
More importantly, centralising power also concentrates political responsibility. As economic uncertainty deepens and public dissatisfaction grows, Prabowo will have fewer political intermediaries to absorb criticism or share the blame for government failures.
His administration will therefore face a fundamental choice: open up political space for criticism and democratic accountability, or tighten control over dissent to protect its authority. The government’s tendency to label critics “foreign lackeys” (antek asing), arrest protesters and expand the military’s role in civilian affairs suggests that the latter approach may prevail.
Gibran’s resignation marks Prabowo’s consolidation of power. This signals Reformasi’s end: democratic institutions survive, yet power is recentralising around elites never dismantled after 1998. The question is no longer who governs, but how far Prabowo will go to silence challengers.
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