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Serbia and Hungary show why playing East against West may no longer pay for small European states

visibility comment0 event November 22, 2026 timer 06:42

By breaking away from illiberal rule, Serbia and Hungary provide examples of states seeking the best of both worlds in their relations with China, Russia and the West.

Serbia’s student-led movement entered parliament on November 17, following its historic electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s party, after two years of protests. Seven months earlier, Hungarian voters ended Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power.

These political transitions, following years of increasingly centralised rule, raise an economic question that extends well beyond the two countries. Can smaller peripheral states still benefit from playing competing great powers against each other?

Hungary, an EU member state, and Serbia, a long-time candidate, followed similar foreign policy strategies. Hungary called it “connectivity”; political scientists call it hedging: maintaining economic relationships with competing great powers, without fully aligning with any one of them.

In practice, both countries continued to anchor in European markets while simultaneously cultivating ties with China, Russia and the US. For years, this geopolitical balancing act seemed to offer economic opportunities and leverage well beyond their size. The countries managed to attract investment, secure energy supply and even strengthen their bargaining positions.

The downside of a hedging strategy, however, has not been made clear. Hedging might work as long as powerful partners tolerate diversified relationships. However, as competition among the major powers intensifies, playing all sides can become increasingly problematic.

Why playing both sides can be profitable

For Hungary, fostering relations with China and Russia bought political and economic influence far beyond its size. Chinese car manufacturer BYD chose Hungary for an electric vehicle factory inside the EU, allowing it to bypass tariffs on cars imported from China.

When Russian oil flows through Ukraine’s Druzhba pipeline stopped in January, the Hungarian government blocked a €90 billion EU
loan to Ukraine. Once the oil supply was restored, the veto was lifted.

Hungary’s central bank also expanded its currency swap line with the People’s Bank of China to 40 billion yuan (about €5 billion) in 2025, to provide for liquidity if Hungarian banks needed Chinese currency.

Serbia has similarly maintained close ties with Russia, relying on Russian energy and Moscow’s diplomatic support over Kosovo. The country has declined to join sanctions against Russia, even though the EU is by far Serbia’s biggest trading partner, with trade in goods reaching €46.5 billion in 2025.

Serbia also opted for Chinese financing for the infrastructure of the debated Budapest–Belgrade railway project.

The rules of the game are changing

Economists Christopher Clayton, Matteo Maggiori and Jesse Schreger argue that great-power rivalry creates different dynamics at different times. While rivals maintain open trade relations because the profits outweigh the strategic costs, small countries can do business with both sides and even negotiate better deals.

However, as rivalry intensifies, a dominant power may cut ties with its rivals and pressure allied countries to do the same. Small economies then lose room to manoeuvre.

The authors’ work explores theoretical models and is not a description of current world affairs. Still, Western sanctions on Russia and US technology curbs on China show how economic relationships can become weaponised.

A hedging strategy does not come with security guarantees. When former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán met Donald Trump in November 2025, he claimed that an American “financial shield” had been negotiated for the country, a claim Trump later denied making.

Hungary did, however, manage to arrange a temporary US sanctions waiver for Russian energy supplies, recently extended until March 2027. Nonetheless, this exemption remains at Washington’s discretion and can be easily withdrawn.

The advantages of foreign investment brought to the country have also been disputed as domestic value added lags behind investments. The OECD reports that foreign firms generate 80% of Hungary’s goods exports, yet only 41% of the value of its manufacturing exports comes from domestic production.

Serbia’s exposure is sharper. Its only oil refinery belongs to NIS, a Russian-controlled company hit by US sanctions, which has been operating under a temporary US licence extended until December 11.

Hungary’s MOL has been preparing negotiations to buy the Russian majority stake with American authorisation, but the deal remains incomplete.

Weak oversight also had a political cost. Procurement exemptions for foreign investors had been flagged by the European Commission. The tragic Novi Sad station collapse sparked protests that eventually overturned the government.

What is the price of autonomy?

Hungary’s new government is reviewing Chinese investment deals and plans to tighten oversight of battery plants, particularly regarding environmental issues. After anti-corruption reforms put in place by the new government, the EU lifted restrictions on €4.2 billion in funding in October.

Serbia’s winning movement also promises more transparent institutions, yet its foreign-policy programme implies continuity. The aim is to seek closer economic relations with the EU, while maintaining ties with China and Russia, including opposing sanctions on Moscow.

Neither election was centred around foreign policy, yet both cases demonstrate how the quest for geopolitical leverage can become intertwined with structural weaknesses at home.

Hedging can bring economic benefits while powerful partners tolerate it, but the gains can become difficult to sustain when rivalry intensifies. Sanctions waivers can be withdrawn, licences can expire, and foreign investments can become sources of political pressure.

The argument is not about abandoning economic diversification, but about creating resilience. Transparent investment agreements, stronger institutions and more domestic value added can help countries resist external pressures. International cooperation based on rules, rather than personal deals, offers more stability.

The EU plays an important role in relieving the economic pressures that motivate smaller states to hedge between competing powers. Recognising the unequal costs of some common policies, as well as ensuring small countries benefit more visibly from the EU’s collective bargaining power, can strengthen unity.

The real measure of autonomy is not how many powerful friends a small country has in times of harmony, but how much room for manoeuvre remains when great powers ask their allies to get in line.
Dr. Lilla Bankuty-Balogh ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

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