Evidence of the very real trauma of war in Ukraine

A recent study estimates that one in three civilans in Ukraine meet the criteria for PTSD or CPTSD.

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Overnight on Wednesday, which marked 1,680 days since Vladimir Putin launched his full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia unleashed a heavy barrage of strikes against energy infrastructure in Kyiv and other major cities. As weather forecasters predict freezing overnight temperatures in coming days, many suspect this is the beginning of a campaign to knock out Ukraine’s grid and leave people in the cold and darkness as winter approaches.

The Ukrainian people have been living in a state of full-scale war for more that four and a half years now, and the news that the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has signed off on a defence budget of 17 trillion roubles – more than £150 billion – for the next year, will hit morale even further.

But for those in eastern parts of Ukraine, which have been in a state of conflict since 2014 since Russia annexed Crimea and occupied large swaths of territory, conflict has been a constant and traumatic reality of life.

We often read of the Ukrainian people being “resilient in the face of conflict”. And so they are. But Gwendolyn Sasse and Deirdre MacManus believe this is unhelpful, as it can mask the trauma that has inevitably affected so many in this war-torn country.

The two researchers are part of a team that has been assessing the level of trauma in Ukraine. Their study, published this week, estimates that about one-third of civilians display symptoms which are consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSFD) and its close companion CPTSD (the “c” being for complex PTSD, which can also bring persistent difficulties with self-worth, emotional regulation and relationships).

Importantly, the figures only included people who they spoke with who appeared to meet the established criteria for PTSD/CPTSD. Many more displayed symptoms of deep trauma. More than 71% of respondents said their neighbourhood had been hit by shelling, 44.5% had either lost or had a loved one seriously injured as a result of the conflict and nearly 33% had either been displaced from their home or their loved ones as a result of the war.

This war cannot end soon enough. But the effects of the trauma on Ukrainian people will take a long time to heal.

Read more:
One in three Ukrainian civilians estimated to meet the criteria for PTSD or complex PTSD – new study

To make matters worse, Russia is now hitting Ukrainian cities with a new class of jet-powered drones which are proving far more difficult to defend against. Air force spokesperson Colonel Yuriy Ihnat told the Financial Times recently that Ukraine was intercepting only about 60% of attacks by the new Geran-5 drone, compared with a success rate of 95% previously.

The Geran-5 is apparently more like a cruise missile than a drone and can go higher, further and – crucially – faster than the drones previously used by Russia. Marina Miron and Rod Thornton of the War Studies team at King’s College London have been researching the drones and assess what makes them so dangerous for Ukraine’s defenders.

Read more:
Russia’s new jet-powered drones mark latest evolution in air war above Ukraine

US restrictions

Meanwhile, it was reported recently that the US president, Donald Trump, has been urging Volodymyr Zelensky, to stop his military from targeting Russian oil facilities. Ukraine has waged a particularly successful campaign against refineries this year, reportedly hitting one every three days in the first eight months of the year. The potential effect on duel prices is apparently what is bothering the US president

Asked about this after the pair met on the sidelines of last week’s UN general assembly meeting, Zelensky reportedly said he’d told Trump that any concessions must go both ways and that Russia must agree not to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure (it hasn’t).

This isn’t the first time a US president has tried to dictate how Ukraine defends itself against Russian aggression. Joe Biden refused to give permission for Kyiv to use American long-range missiles to hit targets inside Russia, for fear of how Putin might retaliate (there was a lot of talk of a nuclear response at the time).

As David Galbreath notes, the two presidents may have had different strategic motives, but their demands appear to reflect a belief in Washington that the US can legitimately try to control the way Ukraine defends itself. Whether, and for how long this belief remains realistic, must these days be a matter for debate.

Read more:
US attempts to control Ukraine’s attacks on Russia reflect a fundamental strategic disconnect

US leaves Iraq after 23 years

More than two decades after George W Bush declared “mission accomplished” in Iraq, the final US units moved out of the country this week. The final withdrawal, on September 30, was supposed to happen on the same day as the deadline for the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other armed factions to be brought under state control. But the latter has yet to happen.

And, given the PMF and many of the other armed groups have close links with Iran, the extent that they will be brought under Iraqi control must remain a subject of some debate.

But all in all US withdrawal will be seen in Tehran as something of a bonus. Iran has spent the past two decades cultivating networks of influence inside Iraq. Military ties with armed groups such as the PMF are well known. But Tehran has also developed strong economic and, crucially, political links with powerful groups in Iraq.

Middle East expert Bamo Nouri points out that these ties will be invaluable for Iran when it comes to circumventing Washington’s sanctions. US withdrawal effectively leaves Iran with a pressure valve against the isolation that Washington has been driving so hard to enforce.

Read more:
America’s final military withdrawal from Iraq is a major bonus for Iran

Baltics brace for hybrid war from Moscow

When European defence ministers got together in Brussels this week to discuss collective response to Russian aggression, once of the main topics of conversation was the Kremlin’s use of hybrid warfare. This is generally understood as the sort of hostile acts that stop short of actual military conflict.

It can include things like sabotage, disinformation, airspace violations, political interference and cyberwarfare. We’ve seen some evidence of this throughout Europe in recent years, but in the Baltic states they’ve been putting up with it for decades.

Alex Hardy is working with the Estonian government to develop ways to counter this strategy. Here he reveals how this might work.

Read more:
As Baltic states face Russian hybrid aggression, our research shows what Europe can do

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