Brazil elections 2026: First-round victories demand a commitment to democracy by the far-right that has not yet been made

Once the 2026 Brazilian elections are over, in order to uphold democracy, we must ensure the strength of our institutions far beyond simply guaranteeing fair elections.

Ads

The first round of Brazil’s 2026 elections helkd this Sunday, Oct. 4, ended with a resounding victory for the far-right Liberal Party (PL). Son of the jailed former President Jair Bolsonaro, Flávio Bolsonaro came out ahead of the current president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, in the race for the second round, with more than 47% of the valid votes. His party also secured the largest blocs in both the Chamber of Deputies – Brazil’s Congress lower house – and the Senate, in addition to five state governments.

Political scientists had already predicted such a scenario. Even with polls showing better numbers for Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT), in the final days of the campaign we saw a shift in votes driven by anti-PT sentiment and discontent fueled largely by unmet consumer expectations. This is true even at a time of low inflation and low unemployment. Still, the race remains wide open for a runoff on Oct.25.

So far, the electoral process has proceeded without serious incidents

Elections alone do not build democracy. But, to cite just two essential figures in political science, Joseph Schumpeter and Adam Przeworski, free elections are, in the most basic conception of democracy, one of the necessary conditions for its existence: an arrangement in which leaders compete for votes periodically and the defeated accept their loss.

Notably, this is an instrumental view and, as such, is strongly contested by those who expect more from democracy than just elections. But that is precisely why it is worth remembering this the day after the first round of voting. Being able to choose governments through the ballot box, respecting the outcome, without anyone taking up arms or staging a sit-in at a military barracks, is no small matter.

Since 1989, the year of the first direct presidential election after the end of the military dictatorship, the Workers’ Party has been one of the main political contenders, consistently finishing among the top two. In seven of the ten elections, PT’s presidential candidate was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who won three of them and is now once again in the runoff. In the last three elections, including the current one (2018, 2022, and 2026), the other side of the race has been occupied by the far right, represented by Jair Bolsonaro in the first two and — now that he is under house arrest — by his son, Flávio.

In 2018, Jair Bolsonaro emerged victorious. Around him, the right has reorganized itself, primarily around conservative moral agendas, such as the defense of Christian values, support for the military dictatorship, and opposition to sexual and reproductive rights, with a strong emphasis on reinforcing traditional gender roles.

In 2022, Lula, who had been arrested on charges of involvement in corruption scandals, ran for office again and, this time, emerged victorious, defeating Jair Bolsonaro, who was seeking reelection. In a blatant disregard for even the most basic principles of democracy, the day after the election was marked by roads and military barracks occupied by far-right supporters — a clear sign of their refusal to accept defeat.

Restrained at first, they returned after the inauguration in an orchestrated act on January 8, 2023, when organized groups of Bolsonaro supporters stormed and vandalized the headquarters of the three branches of government in the Federal District, mirroring the storming of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The acts of vandalism at the National Congress, the Planalto Palace, and the Federal Supreme Court led to hundreds of Bolsonaro supporters being convicted.

Given the severity of the act, Bolsonaro himself was sentenced to prison by the Federal Supreme Court (STF) as the leader of the criminal organization that attempted the coup, alongside high-ranking military officers and a federal deputy.

Erratic polls

This will be the third election in which PT supporters and Bolsonaro supporters will engage in a fierce race for the Presidency that goes all the way to the runoff. In 2026, up until Election Day and throughout the entire campaign, poll predictions have not held up consistently for more than a week. Studies in political science offer some clues.

It is known that the PT has a hard-core base that guarantees about 30% of the vote, while the anti-PT camp accounts for another 30% or so. Not every leftist is a PT supporter, and not every anti-PT voter is a Bolsonaro supporter, but the groups often overlap.

More recent articles report that identification with the right has also taken hold among voters, beyond just support for Bolsonaro. And some evidence shows that women have a stronger preference for Lula, while evangelicals have an even stronger preference for Bolsonaro — whether the father or the son.

Runoff elections rarely alter the outcome of the first round (even if it is possible). The pattern in which incumbents had a better chance of winning has been changing, and in Latin America, the “pink tide” has been replaced by a wave of victorious far-right candidates, as has occurred in Argentina and Chile.

Once the elections are over, we must ensure the strength of our institutions far beyond simply guaranteeing fair elections to preserve democracy. This is especially true in a context where the far right — which has attacked institutions on numerous occasions and is a persistent denier of science (as we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic) — will hold the largest blocs in Congress and may also secure the Presidency.

Thus, the work of these institutions — composed of people with different political preferences — becomes even more crucial. It is up to them to ensure rules that apply to everyone and that allow, even if only minimally, for the independence of the three branches of government, as well as fair, periodic elections with political opponents who can win or lose.

Upholding democracy, in victory or defeat

With an eye on Latin America but deeply concerned about the situation in the United States, last May, at a conference in Paris, Przeworski — the very same scholar known for his minimalist conception of democracy — drew attention to two points. According to the political scientist, we cannot assume that democracy ceases to exist when a candidate we do not like is elected; on the contrary, this demonstrates that the system is functioning properly.

On the other hand, he noted that in the U.S., the erosion of democracy during Trump’s second term has been eliminating the possibility of fair, periodic elections in which defeat is accepted. This serves as a warning for Brazil.

We will not know who Brazil’s next president will be until October 25. Whomever emerges victorious, the rule remains the same: the election must be fair, and the loser must accept the result. On this point, the two sides do not have the same track record. Lula lost three consecutive presidential elections, and yet members of the Workers’ Party did not go to Brasília to ransack Congress. The same cannot be said of the far right. The last time it lost, the outcome were the January 8, 2023 riots, when not even the most basic concept of democracy was respected.

For this reason, the commitment expected of the Brazilian far-right now is twofold. If it loses, it must accept defeat. If it wins, it must govern within the rules that enabled its victory, respecting the Judiciary, the press, the opposition, and the possibility of being defeated four years from now. A democratic government must go beyond this, ensuring that different groups have access to power and that inequality is reduced. But without this first step, no other step is possible, and it is this step that the far-right must guarantee.

This text is the result of a partnership between The Conversation Brazil and Brazil’s National Association of Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences (ANPOCS). Débora Thomé will present one of her papers at the 50th ANPOCS Annual Meeting, taking place October 7–9. Check out the full program here.
Débora Thomé não presta consultoria, trabalha, possui ações ou recebe financiamento de qualquer empresa ou organização que poderia se beneficiar com a publicação deste artigo e não revelou nenhum vínculo relevante além de seu cargo acadêmico.

Tags: Academic Journalism, The Conversation, The Conversation Academic News