Putin’s United Russia will win – but vote tally, turnout and level of coercion will tell the real story of Russia’s wartime elections

0 September 16, 2026 19:42

Russia’s 2026 parliamentary elections will take place over three days, starting Sept. 18.

Russia’s parliamentary elections will take place on Sept. 18-20, 2026, amid the ongoing war with Ukraine. Given the backdrop of an energy crisis, battlefield failures in Ukraine and fears of more national conscription at home, you might think that the Kremlin should have reason for concern.

Yet few observers believe the result is in doubt: Russian President Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party will undoubtedly win. Anything less will demonstrate societal disloyalty to the government and opposition to the Ukraine War. And the Kremlin will not allow that.

In 2020, I wrote a book that demonstrated how the Kremlin does not have to engage in massive vote fraud to win a parliamentary majority. Russia’s election managers have consistently used coercive tactics and pressured business and bureaucratic managers to ensure workers support the government.

To me, the real indicators of public support for the government are the vote margin for Putin’s party and the extent to which the Kremlin places its thumb on the scale to maintain its party’s two-thirds majority of parliamentary seats.

The Kremlin’s tall order

Russians are no doubt entering the vote feeling gloomy about the country’s prospects. A war in Ukraine meant to last only days has dragged on for years and is increasing costs on Russian civilians. Ukrainian drone attacks have targeted Russian energy and retail infrastructure; casualty figures are far higher than thought possible at the beginning of the conflict; inflation is rising; and in many regions, unemployment is also increasing.

Lines of cars form outside a gas station in St. Petersburg on Sept. 15, 2026, amid acute fuel shortages.
Timur Kasumov/Anadolu via Getty Images

United Russia’s popularity has been hovering around 32% in public opinion polls. It is the lowest figure since the full invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. And even then, the number is likely inflated by respondents’ fear of revealing their opposition.

Over the course of 20 years, the Kremlin developed an arsenal of tools to manage elections out of view of voters.

For example, it has relied in the past on gerrymandering districts, redrawing urban districts to look like flower petals in order to incorporate aging voters in small towns and rural areas who tend to be more supportive of the regime.

But in this election, unlike in the past, the Kremlin has not offered financial incentives to these groups. In addition, casualties are disproportionately concentrated in rural areas, and the lack of fuel is impeding the harvest.

The Kremlin can invariably find ways for its loyalists to vote, but it must overcome these hurdles to reach the threshold required for United Russia to manufacture and retain a constitutional parliamentary majority.

Controlling the vote

Fortunately for the Kremlin, there are opportunities to falsify the elections without leaving telltale signs that might provoke postelection protests.

The election will be held over three days, allowing officials to monitor vote counts and adjust them over the voting period. The fact that many voters will vote online will also help hide any manipulation from public view.

These are not unreasonable electoral concerns. Both statistical analyses and reports by Russian and European election observers have identified significant fraud in past elections. In this round of voting, there will be few independent observers. The election watchdog GOLOS, or “Vote,” was disbanded in the face of Kremlin pressures, and European monitors were not invited to observe this election.

Most importantly, the Kremlin controls who can compete in elections. Since the early 2000s, it has created an artificial party system, adding parties to give the illusion of competition.

In addition to Putin’s party, United Russia, the system includes 18 other parties. Of these, only 10 will be on the ballot – and all have been handpicked by the Kremlin because they will not challenge the government with opposition legislation or open criticism. Most are there to give the pretense of competition and absorb opposition votes, but they will not get enough support to be seated in the Parliament.

In addition to electoral controls, repression and disinformation have eliminated nonpartisan organized opposition. The Kremlin’s dismantling of opposition figure Alexei Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation illustrates its power.

Founded months before postelection protests in 2011, the Anti-Corruption Foundation built a national organization to mount electoral challenges, and it linked elections and voting to popular protest to give voice to opposition. But in 2021, the Kremlin declared the foundation an “extremist” organization; it now operates in exile. Navalny died in prison in 2024 – his supporters and outside bodies insist he was murdered – and most of its regional leaders have also been jailed.

The Yabloko surprise

Given its history of suppressing authentic opposition, the Kremlin-controlled Central Election Commission’s July 2026 decision to allow one independent, anti-war opposition party, Yabloko, to compete came as a surprise.

At the time, only 3% of Russians supported the party, perhaps leading the Kremlin to conclude that including it on the ballot was a safe choice.

But despite its relatively small following, Yabloko – as the only anti-war party among those initially approved to compete – could have served as a barometer of antipathy toward Russia’s conduct of its war in Ukraine.

As such, its role in the election was short-lived, and the Central Election Commission soon reversed its decision. Yabloko lost a subsequent Supreme Court appeal, and its second in command, Lev Shlosberg, was sentenced to 11 years in jail for a crime commonly called “fakes against the military.”

Whether Yabloko’s registration was a trial balloon or an abandoned ruse to validate the election, its elimination means that there is now no anti-war party on the ballot.

Spoiled ballots, disengaged voters

Given the control that the Kremlin has over all stages of the election process, outside observers may question why the Kremlin would be so concerned about what looks to be a sure-bet election.

The danger for the Kremlin isn’t so much about the result, but that discussions about how to vote will spark a new shared sense of growing opposition among Russians. Navalny taught Russians to use their vote as a protest within the controlled environment. During the 2011-2012 protests in Russia, he instructed voters to choose “anyone but United Russia.” Several years later, he developed a “Smart Vote” app to coordinate voting on acceptable approved opposition candidates. The idea wasn’t to oust United Russia, but to undermine it.

A makeshift memorial for late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in Berlin on Feb. 17, 2026.
Ralf Hirschberger/AFP via Getty Images

Now working in exile, the Anti-Corruption Foundation is planning to use a modified version of Smart Vote to enable protest voting. Some voters will follow these instructions, while others will write in “Yabloko” or spoil their ballots to express opposition.

While many Russians are disengaged from politics because they feel powerless, they may engage in protest voting if they think that their action will matter to change the state’s policies.

The potential for visible dissent has reportedly forced the Kremlin to lower its expectations over how many Russians will turn out to vote for United Russia.

And while almost no analyst is predicting anything other than a United Russia win, a lower turnout or an underwhelming winning margin for the party will be taken by Russians to be a clear signal of the true state of support for the war — and discontent with the government.
Regina Smyth does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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